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FINANCIAL MARKET DESTABILIZATION AND THE ROLE
OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE SEC'S ROLE GOING FORWARD
Janis Sarra*
I. INTRODUCTION
International financial market participants and regulators are watching
as the United States attempts to come to grips with the most serious
consequences of the crisis in financial markets. Multiple strategies are
being used, including bailouts, bank stimulus packages, recapitalization
of financial institutions, insolvency restructurings, mortgage programs,
guarantees for interbank lending, and direct asset purchases. The causes
of the financial turmoil are numerous and complex, but one underlying
cause was activities in the credit derivatives market. Bear Steams'
financial crisis arose after it was unable to obtain further credit needed to
meet its commitments under the sub-prime and derivatives markets. It
was rescued through brokering efforts of the U.S. Federal Reserve and
U.S. Treasury, which coordinated the merger of Bear Steams and JP
Morgan Chase. Lehman Brothers filed bankruptcy because of its sub-
prime and credit default swap exposure.' Merrill Lynch merged with
Bank of America to avoid bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. investment
banks that have survived, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, for
example, have become bank holding companies under jurisdiction of the
U.S. Federal Reserve. 2 Together, these events marked the end of major
investment banks in the United States.
The fragmentation of regulation over the U.S. financial system, with
* Dr. Janis Sarra, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, Vancouver, Canada. The
information in this article is current to April 2009.
1. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement on Proposed Lehman Brothers, Inc.
Acquisition by Barclays (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
206.htm.
2. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Sept. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080921 a.htm. In the United States, the Glass-
Steagall Act bifurcated banking; commercial banks were allowed to take deposits and make loans and
investment banks were buying and selling securities and involved more generally in transaction-based
corporate finance. Most of the prohibitions on commercial banks being engaged in securities
transactions were repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.), although the distinction had been eroded
through the grant of exemptions to commercial banks to underwrite securities, and exemptions to
investment banks to own commercial bank subsidiaries.
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at least five oversight bodies, has arguably resulted in significant gaps in
regulatory oversight. The treatment of credit default swaps is one of
them. This Article explores the issue of credit default swaps, and the
potential role of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) going
forward.3 Credit default swaps are the most common credit derivative
product globally. 4  The figures on the extent of the credit derivatives
market vary, but they are all in the tens of trillions of U.S. dollars, of
which about 80% are credit default swaps. 5 Credit default swaps have
been around for a number of years. They are financial instruments that
were originally designed to manage risk exposure. However, a number
of shifts in the market, including a radical increase in the speculative
aspects of the market, the diminution of credit ratings, and the shift in
market share from banks to hedge funds, created problems that
eventually contributed to a number of financial failures. The policy
question now is how to preserve the positive risk management aspects of
credit default swaps while slowing the speculative aspects of the market.
In relation to the SEC, the question is, what is its oversight, policy, and
enforcement role with respect to such derivatives?
This Article is divided into three parts. Part II discusses credit default
swaps, their recent role in financial markets and their effects on
governance of corporations. Part III examines the role of the SEC
historically in respect of derivatives and the current question of whether
it should acquire regulatory power over credit default swaps. Part IV
then suggests some additional policy considerations that should guide
the SEC's deliberations as it charts a course for the future.
II. THE CONTRIBUTION OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS TO RISK
MANAGEMENT
A credit default swap (CDS) is a bilateral executory derivative
instruments that can be used to hedge credit risk. Under a CDS, one
party, the "protection buyer," pays a sum of money periodically to the
3. This paper was presented at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, Symposium on
New Models of Regulating the Financial Markets, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 3, 2009, examining the SEC
on its 75th anniversary.
4. There are numerous kinds of credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps, collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs), full and index trades, and credit-linked notes. Credit derivatives are classified
as either single or multiname (basket) products. Single name credit derivatives are targeted on the credit
worthiness of a single reference entity. Multiname products hedge the risk of clustered defaults in a
portfolio. Elizabeth Murphy, Janis Sarra & Michael Creber, Credit Derivatives in Canadian Insolvency
Proceedings, "The Devil will be in the Details" in ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW, 2006, at
187-234 (Janis Sarra ed. 2007).
5. International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), Derivatives by Type and Market
Share, http://isda.org/ at 3.
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"protection seller," usually referable to the amount of protection
provided by the contract. 6  The CDS typically refers to a "reference
entity," the company with respect to which credit protection is sought, or
"reference asset" or security, the underlying assets for which protection
is sought;7 the "credit event", such as a payment default; the debt
obligations of the reference entity whose nonpayment constitutes a
credit event; and the deliverable obligations or cash settlement payment
that is to be delivered on the occurrence of a credit event. The value of a
CDS financial contract is based on underlying obligations of the
reference entity or reference security, or indices of several such entities,
securities, or obligations.
The protection seller's obligation to pay arises on the occurrence of a
credit event, most frequently, the reference entity's default on payments
owed, bankruptcy filing, or commencing restructuring proceedings.
8
The reference entity is not a party to the CDS. A lender is able, through
a CDS, to purchase protection against a borrower's payment default. A
CDS also enables the protection seller to receive income in exchange for
assuming exposure to the borrower's credit. Investors purchase a CDS
to offset or insure against risk in their fixed-income portfolios, to take
synthetic positions in bonds or in segments of the debt market
represented by an index. 9
The protection buyer that is a creditor of the reference entity hedges
the risk of default by that entity. In other words, if a bank lends $50
million to an auto company, it can purchase a CDS for that amount. If
the auto company files for insolvency restructuring, the bank, as
"protection buyer," is paid out the value of the CDS and does not lose
that value with the bankruptcy of the company. The protection buyer
faces counterparty risk in that its ability to successfully protect itself
against a failure or default of a reference entity depends on the
protection seller's ability to perform its obligations under the CDS.
Lehman Brothers, Bear Stems, and other failures left numerous
protection buyers vulnerable when these protection sellers were unable
to meet their CDS obligations.' 0
6. ISDA, FAQs On the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and the OTC
Derivatives Business 4, http://isda.org/media/pdf/resourcesfaqs.pdf (last visited March 11, 2010).
7. The reference entity can, in reality, be a company, a governmental entity, or any other
borrowing entity.
8. Murphy, Sarra & Creber, supra note 4, at 212.
9. Janis P. Sarra, Credit Derivatives Market Design, Creating Fairness and Sustainability 6
(Network for Sustainable Fin. Strategies, Consultation Paper No. 1, 2009),
available at http://www.sustainablefinancialmarkets.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/sarra-credit-
derivatives_20jan091 .pdf.
10. Id. at 3.
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CDSs are generally documented under the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association's (ISDA) master agreement and a schedule that
parties use to supplement or modify the master agreement. 1" Parties to a
CDS often enter into a credit support annex that establishes a framework
for the collateralization of credit exposures by one or both parties. The
terms of an individual CDS transaction are documented in a
"confirmation" that incorporates the master agreement, schedule, and
credit support annex, although many definitions and terms have become
highly standardized and are not negotiated.
The CDS protection seller acquires the default risk of the reference
entity. The protection buyer need not suffer an actual loss to be eligible
for compensation if a credit event occurs. Credit derivatives do not
require either the protection seller or protection buyer to actually hold an
interest in the referenced asset or entity. Therefore the protection
purchased by the protection buyer can be more than, less than, or
completely unconnected to its underlying exposure to the reference
entity. In this respect, a credit default swap differs from a basic forward
or commodities contract where there is an economic interest in the
product and hedging against price fluctuations. Unlike insurance, the
amount of compensation claimed under a CDS is not related to actual
losses suffered by the protection buyer.
CDSs have provided an important tool for risk management. They
enable banks and other financial institutions to hedge the credit risk of
lending to corporations, in turn facilitating economic activity. Hedging
credit risk arguably frees up funds to be lent elsewhere, making more
capital available for financings, which can reduce the cost of borrowing.
There have been significant changes in the CDS market in the past
five years. The original objective of managing risk of direct investment
under lending portfolios was overtaken by a speculative market for
buying and selling CDSs in multiples of value of the underlying
reference entity. CDSs enable market participants to take "long" or
"short" positions on the credit quality of a reference entity without
transacting directly in the debt obligations of the company, allowing for
speculation on the solvency or credit worthiness of the entity. Some
counterparties participate in the CDS market to capitalize on the
volatility in credit spreads during times of economic uncertainty.
Global credit derivatives exposures by ratings began shifting
downward in 2000. Hedge funds increasingly took a greater share of
both the buy side and sell side of the market. Hedge funds went from
11. ISDA, 2002 Master Agreement Protocol 1-2 (2003), http://www.isda.org/
2002masterprot/docs/2002Protocol.doc.
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3% of the market on the buy side in 2000 to 28% in 2006. As a seller,
their market share grew from 5% to 32% in the same period.' 2 Those
derivatives were then hedged in further credit derivatives in multiples of
the value of the originating reference entities. Hedge funds played a role
in driving credit derivatives down the credit curve. As spreads tightened
and margins squeezed at the upper end of the credit curve, hedge funds
shifted to more speculative investment grades and unrated exposures to
preserve returns. In 2002, 36% of all credit derivatives globally were
rated at AA or AAA, whereas only 8% were rated as below investment
grade. Just four years later, in 2006, only 17% of credit derivatives
globally were rated at AA or AAA, whereas 31% were rated below
investment grade. ' 3
The largest players globally on both the buy side and sell side were
Bear Stems, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Merrill Lynch, and Royal Bank of
Scotland. 14 Notwithstanding the tremendous growth in the derivatives
market from the early 1990s, there was a lack of transparency of the
degree of exposure by the commercial banks, investment banks, and
other market participants until tightening market conditions and lack of
liquidity forced several of them to take action when they could not meet
their counterparty obligations. For example, AIG's collapse was caused
largely because its financial products subsidiary was unable to post
additional cash collateral on its outstanding $526 billion portfolio of
CDS obligations due to its overexposure. 15 AIG had a sound insurance
business globally, but its United Kingdom financial products operation
was given wide latitude to participate in the derivatives market, and
commitments with respect to derivatives pulled the entire business
down. In this respect, there was a failure of governance, as AIG's board
did not foresee that the amount of net exposure it had in the market was
a risk to its business.
While the disruption to the global financial market in 2008 resulted in
an overall decline in CDS trading volume, the dollar value of CDS
transactions has continued to grow. The Bank for International
Settlements (the Bank) has estimated that the total notional amount of
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives contracts outstanding was $592
trillion at the end of December 2008.16 Severely strained credit markets
12. BRITISH BANKERS' Assoc., BBA CREDIT DERIVATIVES REPORT 2006 (2006). In 2000,
banks accounted 81% of the buy side and 63% of the sell side of market share; that number dropped to
59% and 44% respectively by 2006.
13. Murphy, Sarra, & Creber, supra note 4, at 195 (discussing Fitch Ratings).
14. Id.
15. AIG Insurance was required to begin to book billions of dollars of losses as the risk exposure
on the CDSs it sold rose in price with the deteriorating credit position of the reference entities.
16. MONETARY & ECON. DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET
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and multilateral netting of contracts led to a contraction of 26.9% in
outstanding CDSs from the previous year.1 7 The Bank reports that the
volume of outstanding CDS contracts fell 27% in the second half of
2008 to $41.9 trillion. Single-name contracts declined by 22.8% to
$25.7 trillion while multiname CDS indices and CDS index tranches
decreased 32.7%, to $16.1 trillion. Despite lower outstanding volumes,
the gross market value of CDS contracts increased by 78.2%, $5.7
trillion, at the end of December 2008.18
The Bank also reported that greater use of multilateral netting during
the second half of 2008 resulted in a change in composition across
CDSs, in that amounts outstanding of multiname contracts fell 32.7% to
$16.1 trillion, while single-name contracts declined 22.8% to $25.7
trillion. 19
The notional amount of outstanding CDSs does not represent the
actual risk in the CDS market; ISDA's 2007 Year End Market Survey
estimated the gross market (or replacement) value of outstanding CDSs
to be just over $2 trillion, less than 3.5% of the notional figure.
Multilateral netting helps reduce the aggregate notional size of the
market to more closely approximate the actual amount at risk.20
A majority of the CDS market is bilateral OTC transactions between
dealers, including approximately twenty global commercial and
investment banks.2' Intermediaries supply liquidity to the CDS market,
accumulating large notional exposures that are offset with transactions
with the same or different counterparties. The composition across
counterparties changed in 2008. CDS contracts between reporting
dealers declined 24.4%, whereas outstanding contracts between dealers
and other financial institutions decreased 29.8%, and contract volumes
between dealers and nonfinancial institutions decreased 47.7%.22 The
ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2008, at 1 (2009), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc-hy0905.pdf~noframes=l. The statistics cover the notional amounts and
gross market values outstanding of the worldwide consolidated OTC derivatives exposure of major
banks and dealers in the G1O countries.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2. Gross market values grew 95.6% to $3.7 trillion for single-name contracts and
52.5% to $2 trillion for multiname contracts.
19. Id.
20. ICE TRUST, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5, https://www.theice.com/
publicdocs/clearus/ICETrustFAQ.pdf.
21. Reducing Risks and Improving Oversight in the OTC Credit Derivatives Market: Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs,
110th Cong. 2 (2008), available at http://banking.senate.gov/
public/index.cfin?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=5661694b-6b93-4807-b747-d6ae430fe 102
(testimony of Patrick M. Parkinson, Deputy Dir., Div. of Research & Statistics, Fed. Reserve Bd.).
22. MONETARY & ECON. DEP'T, supra note 16, at 3.
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market value of contracts between reporting dealers grew by 89.3% to
$3.2 trillion, representing 56.2% of the total market value of outstanding
CDS contracts. The market value of contracts between reporting dealers
and other financial institutions increased by 66.3%, while the market
value of contracts between dealers and nonfinancial institutions
increased 51%.23 Hence, while the sub-prime and asset-backed
commercial paper markets collapsed during the height of the financial
crisis, the CDS market suffered losses but has continued to grow. Yet
its impact on both financial markets and real economic activity
continues to be poorly understood.
The notional amount of the CDS market does not reflect net
exposures after offsetting positions, the probability or risk of default of
the reference entity, the risk that the counterparty will default on its
obligations under the CDS, or the probability of recovery amounts that
counterparties will collect on occurrence of such default. The lack of
transparency in the market, and previous lack of a central counterparty
or centralized data collection and dissemination system, means that
actual risk exposure in the market is unknown. When the financial
markets began to seriously deteriorate, the CDS exposures of
counterparties crystallized, creating a major crisis in the ability of
protection sellers to ensure coverage.
On the protection buyer side of a CDS transaction, there is no
disclosure obligation with respect to information that the buyer may
have regarding material adverse risk to the underlying reference entity.
While the protection seller takes on that risk, in many jurisdictions there
is no prohibition, as there is in securities law, not to use insider
information in purchasing the swap. Equally significant, protection
buyers rely on the financial viability of protection sellers so that their
claims can be met in case of a credit event. Yet the protection seller is
not required to disclose its capacity to settle the derivatives. In this
respect, credit derivatives differ from other bilateral contracts where the
credit worthiness of a counterparty is typically dealt with through
negotiated credit controls, including collateral requirements, covenants,
representations and warranties, and the oversight and monitoring of a
credit officer of the lending entity.24
The European Union (EU) Joint Market Practices Forum published
recommendations for handling nonpublic information by credit market
participants, including recommending that prohibitions on insider
dealing apply to dealings in any credit derivative whose value depends
23. Id.
24. Sarra, supra note 9, at 3.
2009]
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on a publicly-traded security. 25 To comply with the principles of the
EU's Market Abuse Directive, it has suggested that lenders that hedge
credit risk by purchasing CDSs referencing their borrowers who possess
material nonpublic information should be found subject to a duty of trust
and confidence owed to their borrower.26 As with other financial
services markets, failure to disclose material adverse risk can affect the
credibility of the derivatives market. The creation of standards to require
such disclosure in the credit derivative market could assist in preventing
some aspects of the current financial instability.
There are significant agency issues that have arisen with respect to
credit derivatives. Traditionally, a creditor's interest in a debtor
company was to receive return of its capital plus interest and fees, often
premised on encouraging an ongoing credit relationship with the
business enterprise. The introduction of CDSs has, in some instances,
created a misalignment between the creditor's and debtor's interests.27
A creditor can lend an amount to a debtor company and then purchase
CDSs many times the value of the underlying reference asset or entity.
Thus the creditor has an incentive to have the debtor company fail,
triggering a credit event in which the value to the creditor from
settlement of the CDS is greater than repayment of the loan. 2' If the
creditor is a senior lender, it may be able to precipitate the credit event.
Some of the previous willingness by lenders to not enforce covenants for
a limited period to allow a debtor time to devise a business plan may be
less likely now that the lender is not only fully hedged, but
overhedged.29
There have been problems with the credit ratings associated with
CDSs. Credit rating agencies developed inadequate valuation methods
to assess these products, valuing the debt in various tranches higher than
the cost of the underlying asset, making them attractive to sellers, but
creating new counterparty risks. Another explanation is that the
agencies accepted the methodology developed by investment banks
25. See JOINT MKT. PRACTICES FORUM, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING THE HANDLING OF MATERIAL NONPUBLIC INFORMATION BY CREDIT MARKET
PARTICIPANTS: EUROPEAN SUPPLEMENT (2005); Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and
Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. 663,
690,(2008) (briefly discussing insider trading and cross-market manipulations); Sarra, supra note 9, at 5.
26. Sarra, supra note 9, at 5.
27. For a full discussion, see id. at 5-7.
28. Id.
29. See Hu & Black, supra note 25. They call this over-hedging of debt "negative economic
ownership." They observe that there can also be "hybrid" decoupling, whereby investors short their
shares, buying protection with credit default swaps or use a long equity position to hedge a short debt
position. Id. at 665, 682.
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structuring derivatives, without separate assessment. One further
explanation is that credit rating agencies actively promoted synthetic
derivatives, although it was a conflict-of-interest because their fees come
from those that they rate, and those entities have no real choice of rating
agency, given the closed market created by regulators.
30
Historically, the screening and monitoring activities of lenders
produced positive externalities through the bank's decision to lend,
signalling to other stakeholders the quality of the corporate governance
of the borrowing company. 31 The screening and monitoring activities of
a lender produced externalities that benefited numerous stakeholders
with an interest in the corporation, through the bank's decision to lend,
which signalled to potential and existing stakeholders the quality of the
borrower; through the imposition of fixed obligations under the loan
agreement that prevented managerial slack; through security rights that
constrained the ability of managers to liquidate noncash assets or
unilaterally sell more debt; and through loan covenants and monitoring
specified prohibited types of behaviour.32
The exponential growth in CDSs shifted the externalities in a way that
likely contributed to market destabilization. First, the disconnection
between economic interest and residual control rights can create new
incentives, in that originating lenders may be less willing to expend the
time and resources to complete due diligence in undertaking credit
arrangements, as risk is laid off through CDSs or other derivatives.
33
Hence the signalling to the market with the decision to lend is no longer
reliable as a measure of the firm's value.
Second, in lending transactions, parties have frequently given up the
negotiation of terms and conditions-including monitoring, restrictive
covenants and default control rights-because they know that they will
offset their own risk through structured financial products. 34 When the
firm begins to slide into financial distress, corporate stakeholders no
longer share a common goal of maximizing firm value and constraining
managerial slack because the originating lender has hedged its risk
through its derivatives, as have multiple subsequent counterparties.
Stakeholders that could previously rely on the governance role of banks
30. Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers (San
Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-46, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-900257; see also
Mark Zelmer, Reforming the Credit-Rating Process, FIN. SYS. REV. (Ottawa), Dec. 2007, at 51.
31. Sarra, supra note 9, at 8. Externalities occur when an economic activity causes an external
benefit or cost to third party stakeholders that were not directly involved in the transaction.
32. George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1995).
33. Sarra, supra note 9, at 9.
34. Id.
2009] 637
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can no longer do so; yet given the diverse nature of their interests,
information asymmetries, and collective action problems, they are
unlikely to be able to fill this governance gap.
35
Multiplied many times through multiple and complex CDSs, previous
positive externalities are lost and new negative externalities are created,
creating more systemic risks across the market. The signalling through
exit or other creditor reactions to the debtor's decisions is diminished
because banks and other significant lenders may be fully hedged. Yet
that fact is not transparent to other stakeholders, who may still look for
such signalling. Given the global nature of credit derivatives, the
externalities may create systemic problems that require more broad-
based intervention than merely improving disclosure.
Governance issues may arise with the settlement of CDSs after a
credit event. Where there are multiple CDSs with respect to a reference
entity, physical settlement can create cascading swaps. The lending
institution with which the debtor company had an ongoing credit
relationship is no longer involved, and there are multiple new
intermediaries and counterparties as CDSs settle. The company may not
even appreciate it is a reference entity prior to the credit event occurring.
Cascading swaps means multiple rapid changes to who holds a claim,
making it difficult for a debtor company to establish who has a claim, or
to garner the requisite support for a viable business restructuring plan
under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, or similar insolvency
restructuring legislation.
For cash-settled CDSs, unlike insurance, no title to claim passes and
the protection seller receives no right of subrogation. A creditor of a
company that holds a cash-settled CDS has legal claim to the value of
the assets of the financially distressed company, with little or no
financial exposure. A senior secured creditor can have a powerful vote
in a restructuring proceeding, yet has no economic risk remaining in the
company. A debtor company and other creditors have no knowledge that
the creditor has fully hedged its economic risk. The creditor may have
little incentive to engage in constructive negotiations. If it has over-
coverage and a negative economic interest, it may materially benefit if
the company fails.
III. THE SEC AND REGULATORY GAPs
Globally, there has been a lack of regulatory oversight over CDSs.
Either such products are part of the exempt market under securities or
35. Id.
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financial services legislation, or there is not jurisdiction to oversee the
CDS market. In the United States, the SEC's mandate is to advance
investor confidence in capital markets by providing investors with
reliable information; to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient securities
markets; and to enforce regulatory requirements. The SEC's role in the
OTC CDS market, however, was limited to enforcing antifraud
prohibitions under securities laws. 36  The "lack of clear regulatory
authority" over the CDS market has hindered the SEC's ability to
monitor how the market functions or ensure "basic standards of
fairness." 37  Current U.S. statutes significantly restrict financial
regulators' ability to obtain reporting in the CDS market to identify
suspicious trading patterns or better understand systemic risks.
The U.S. regulatory gap was not just the result of domestic politics or
fragmented regulation, but rather, was at least in part the result of a
powerful and effective political lobbying by the industry's organization,
the ISDA, to exclude derivative products from regulatory oversight.
Information asymmetries and collective action problems have prevented
other market participants, such as companies or investors that may be
affected by the agency problems arising from CDSs, from offering an
alternative vision to Congress for regulatory oversight of CDSs.
Prior to the current market turmoil, the SEC had jurisdiction over the
"safety and soundness" of U.S. investment banks. Yet its oversight
consisted largely of an ineffective voluntary compliance program, which
even former SEC Chair Christopher Cox admitted had been a failure. 38
The SEC did not regulate the derivatives activities of U.S. investment
banks, except the antifraud provisions.
The SEC operates on the principle of protection of individual well-
being through investor protection. 39 It has observed that any system of
36. In the United States, CDS transactions qualify as "security-based swap agreements" and are
generally not subject to securities regulation with the exception of antifraud, insider trading, short swing
profit, and anti-manipulation provisions. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 206A & 206B, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999), amended by Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, app. E,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
37. Mary Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at Treasury Department Press
Briefing on OTC Derivatives (May 13, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch05l309mls.htm.
38. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated
Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
230.htm; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEC'S OVERSIGHT OF
BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM,
http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf. U.S. commercial bank oversight included national
banks under the Federal Reserve regulatory system; national banks under supervision of the Comptroller
of Currency within Treasury; and state-chartered banks, supervised by the Federal Reserve System or
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
39. Mary Schapiro, Chair, U.S. See. & Exeh. Comm'n, Address to the Investment Company
2009) 639
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regulation should facilitate fair and efficient financial markets through a
strong and steady regulatory hand, while accommodating lively
competition for capital. The SEC has also observed that any regulatory
reform must promote and preserve public trust in U.S. financial markets.
Arguably, the SEC's potential role in the CDS market includes
transparency initiatives, regulatory oversight, rigorous enforcement, and
encouraging new governance norms.
A. Transparency
The SEC has stated that a significant objective is to improve the
transparency and integrity of the CDS market. It has sent letters to the
public companies that it currently regulates regarding better disclosure
of valuation and how credit risk is incorporated; disclosure of how
counterparty credit risk affects valuation of derivative assets; and how
the ability to collect on derivative assets will impact financial
statement.4°
The SEC is also advocating legislation to create a mandatory system
of recordkeeping and reporting of all CDS trades to aid in fraud
detection. It would require trade and position reporting by dealers in
OTC CDSs to increase transparency and improve pricing. The SEC has
considered requiring position reporting from market participants with
significant positions, to provide information that regulators need to
uncover manipulation and monitor risk. The proposed legislation also
specifies that the SEC and CFTC be given authority to issue new
antifraud rules. The SEC has supported calls for a central counterparty
clearing service (CCP) to enhance disclosure, as discussed in the next
Part.
The SEC has proposed reforms to address the lack of a
comprehensive procedure for rating derivatives; the proposal includes
transparency measures. 41  The reforms would regulate conflicts of
interest, disclosures, internal policies, and business practices. The SEC
has proposed differentiating ratings symbols for structured products. It
has also specified that it has a public education role for credit ratings and
the need for investors to make independent risk assessments.
Institute General Membership Meeting: Building a Stable and Efficient Financial System (May 8, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch050809mls.htm.
40. Eighty percent of CDSs traded globally are currently confirmed through Deriv/SERV, but
such confirmations are optional, and the platform does not serve complex CDS products, which are
unregulated, with the SEC having no access to information stored. See Proposed Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 57,967, 93 SEC Docket 1266
(June 16, 2008).
41. Id.
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B. Regulatory Oversight
The U.S. government needs to make normative decisions regarding
the scope and extent of any new regulation of the CDS market. The
SEC has taken a number of actions in response to the financial market
problems, including acting on concerns that counterparties are unable to
meet their obligations under CDSs.4 2 In addition to the potential
systemic risks that CDSs pose to financial stability, the SEC has
expressed concern about operational risks, as well as risks relating to
manipulation and fraud, and regulatory arbitrage risks in the market.
The President's Working Group on Financial Markets reported that
implementing the central counterparty services for CDSs was a top
priority, recommending that public reporting of prices, trading volumes,
and aggregate open interest should be required to increase market
transparency. The SEC worked closely with the Board of Governors
42. See, e.g., Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,572, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,875 (Sept.
23, 2008) (adopting a package of measures to strengthen investor protections against naked short selling,
including rules requiring a hard T+3 closeout, eliminating the options market maker exception of
Regulation SHO, and expressly targeting fraud in short selling transactions); Emergency Order,
Exchange Act Release No. 58,166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,379 (July 21, 2008) (enhancing protections against
naked short selling in the securities of primary dealers, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)); Emergency Order, Exchange Act
Release No. 58,592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169 (Sept. 24, 2008) (taking temporary emergency action to ban
short selling in financial securities); Amendment to Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No.
58591 A, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,557 (Sept. 25, 2008) (approving emergency rulemaking to ensure disclosure of
short positions by hedge funds and other institutional money managers); Proposed Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 57,967, 73 Fed Reg. 36,212
(June 25, 2008) (proposing rules to strengthen the regulation of credit rating agencies and making the
limits and purposes of credit ratings clearer to investors); Memorandum of Understanding Between the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Regarding Coordination and Information Sharing in Areas of Common Regulatory and Supervisory
Interest (July 7, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg2008O7O7al.pdf (entering into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) to ensure key federal financial regulators
share information and coordinate regulatory activities in important areas of common interest).
43. President's Working Group on Fin. Mkts., Policy Objectives for the OTC Derivatives Market
(Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/policyobjectives.pdf; see also
President's Working Group on Fin. Mkts., Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments (Mar.
2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemkttmmoil_03122008.pdf; President's
Working Group on Fin. Mkts., Progress Update on March Policy Statement on Financial Market
Developments (Oct. 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/q4progress%20update.pdf;
Hearings to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: Hearings Before the H. Comm.
on Agriculture, 1 0th Cong. (2008) (statement of Erik R. Sirri, Dir., Div. of Trading and Mkts., U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n); Memorandum of Understanding Between the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission Regarding Central Counterparties for Credit Default Swaps (Nov. 14, 2008),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/finalmou.pdf. In mid-February 2009, a bill was circulating
in Congress to provide federal regulation of credit default swaps. Derivatives Markets Transparency
and Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 977, 111 th Cong. (2009).
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of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) to create a mechanism to recognize central
counterparties for the CDS market and establish organized markets for
CDSs to reduce systemic and operational risks. To advance this
objective, the SEC, FRB, and CFTC signed a Memorandum of
Understanding in November 2008 that established a framework for
consultation and information sharing on issues related to central
counterparties for credit default swaps, as part of its efforts to enhance
transparency in the CDS market, stabilize financial markets by reducing
counterparty risk, and promote efficiency in the CDS market.
The SEC adopted interim final temporary rules providing exemptions
under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 for certain CDSs to facilitate one or more
central counterparties for those swaps. 44  The interim final temporary
rules define and exempt "eligible credit default swaps," other than the
Section 17(a) antifraud provisions. They are also exempted from
Exchange Act registration requirements and from the provisions of the
Trust Indenture Act, provided certain conditions are met.45 An "eligible
credit default swap" is defined as a bilateral executory derivative
contract, where a buyer makes payments to the seller in return for a
payout if there is a default or other credit event involving identified
obligations or entities; and which specifies obligations, terms, notional
amounts on which payment obligations are calculated, credit-related
events that trigger a settlement obligation, and deliverables on
settlement.46
44. Temporary Exemptions for Eligible Credit Default Swaps, Securities Act Release No. 8999,
Exchange Act No. 59,246, 74 Fed. Reg. 3,967 (Jan. 22, 2009) (codified in scattered sections of 17
C.F.R.).
45. The rules also define as a "qualified purchaser":
any eligible contract participant (as defined in Section la(12) of the Commodity
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. I a(1 2)) as in effect on the date of adoption of this section, other
than a person who is an eligible contract participant under Section l(a)(12)(C) of the
Commodity Exchange Act) that has been sold an eligible credit default swap (as defined
in Rule 239T of this Act) in reliance on Rule 239T of this Act.
17 C.F.R. § 230.146(c) (2009).
46. An "eligible credit default swap" is defined as a:
bilateral executory derivative contract not subject to individual negotiation:
(1) in which a buyer makes payments to the seller and, in return, receives a payout
if there is a default or other credit event involving identified obligation(s) or
identified entity(ies) within a certain time; and
(2) The agreement for which includes the:
(i) Specification of the identified obligation or obligor; or, in the case of an
identified group or index thereof, all of the identified obligations or
obligors comprising any such group or index;
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These rules also define "qualified purchaser" for purposes of the
covered securities provisions of Section 18 of the Securities Act.4 7 The
SEC has observed that CCPs have the potential to reduce some systemic
risk by netting all gains and losses across different instruments; through
uniform margining and robust controls over its exposures, including
specific controls on marketwide exposures; and will assist in preventing
a single market participant failure from destabilizing markets; and assist
trades being cleared in timely fashion. A central counterparty can
enhance the stability of the credit derivatives market by collecting
margin and guaranty fund deposits from each clearing member, to
mitigate the impact of a potential default by one or more clearing
members.48 Conditions for exemptions to operate CCPs include keeping
an audit trail of orders and transactions effects; recordkeeping; reporting
to SEC quarterly on the total dollar value of transactions, unit volume
and notional amount executed, and list of subscribers; confidentiality
requirements for clients; and SEC access to conduct on-site
inspections. 49  The interim final temporary rules are effective January
22, 2009 through November 30, 2010.
A CCP novates bilateral trades, which would result in the CCP
entering separate contractual arrangements with both counterparties to a
CDS, becoming buyer to one and seller to the other. "Novation" is a
"process through which the original obligation between a buyer and
seller is discharged through the substitution of the CCP as seller to buyer
(ii) Term of the agreement;
(iii) Notional amount upon which payment obligations are calculated;
(iv) Credit-related events that trigger a settlement obligation; and
(v) Obligations to be delivered if there is a credit-related event or, if it is a
cash settlement, the obligations whose value is to be used to determine the
amount of settlement obligation under the eligible credit default swap.
17 C.F.R. § 230.239T (2009).
47. See supra note 39.
48. Securities Act Release No. 8999, Exchange Act No. 59,246, 74 Fed. Reg. 3,967 (Jan. 22,
2009).
49. The Securities Act exemption:
also provides that eligible CDS that are or will be issued or cleared by a Registered or
Exempt CCP and are entered into with an issuer of a security, or an underwriter or
affiliate of such issuer, if such security is delivered in settlement or whose value is used
to determine the amount of the settlement obligation, will be considered an offer and sale
of such security at that time .... The Securities Act exemption is limited to offers and
sales to eligible contract participants.
Temporary Exemptions for Eligible Credit Default Swaps, 74 Fed. Reg. at 3,972.
The amendment to "Securities Act Rule 146 applies only to eligible contract participants that
have been sold eligible CDSs in reliance on the new interim final temporary exemption in Securities Act
Rule 239T." Id.
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and buyer to seller, creating two new contracts." 50  Under a CCP
arrangement, both parties entering a CDS would novate their trades to
the CCP, and the CCP would stand in as the counterparty to all parties of
the CDS it clears. As a result of the novation process, the counterparty
risk of a CDS is effectively concentrated in the CCP. In companion
actions to the interim final temporary rules, the SEC temporarily
exempted a clearing agency acting as a CCP from the requirement to
register as a clearing agency under Section 17A of the Exchange Act, as
well as certain eligible contract participants and others from certain
Exchange Act requirements with respect to certain CDSs. The rules'
exemptive orders are intended to facilitate the operation of CCPs that
will clear and settle CDS transactions while enabling the SEC to oversee
the CDS market.
51
"The conditions and representations in the companion exemptive
orders and exemptions require that information be available about the
terms of the CDS, the creditworthiness of the CCP or any guarantor, and
the clearing and settlement process for the CDS.' 52  The "conditions
require that financial information about the reference entity, the issuer of
the reference security, or the reference security be publicly available." 53
Absent an exemption:
the offer and sale of eligible CDS that are or will be issued or cleared by a
Registered or Exempt CCP would have to be registered under the
Securities Act, the eligible CDS that are or have been issued or cleared by
a Registered or Exempt CCP would have to be registered as a class under
the Exchange Act, and the provisions of the Trust Indenture Act would
apply.
54
A Registered or Exempt CCP issuing or clearing eligible CDSs "will
benefit from the temporary exemptions because it will not have to file
registration statements ...covering the offer and sale of the eligible
CDS. . . . [The] cost of filing a registration statement covering the
50. COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT Sys., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 66 (2004). CDS agreements generally are
negotiated and entered into bilaterally, but both parties can agree that one party may novate the
agreement and substitute another party to take responsibility for performance, by acting as the
counterparty.
51. See Temporary Exemptions for Eligible Credit Default Swaps, 74 Fed. Reg. at 3,968. It also
temporarily exempted "any exchange that effects transactions in certain CDS from the requirements
under Sections 5 and 6 of the Exchange Act to register as a national securities exchange, and any broker
or dealer that effects transactions on an exchange in certain CDS from the requirements of Section 5 of
the Exchange Act." Id. (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 3,973.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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eligible CDS would be lessened further as the information regarding the
CCP already would be prepared. 55
The SEC suggests that approval of the exemptions will promote
stability in financial markets by reducing the counterparty risks posed by
the default or financial distress of a major market participant. The
exemptions will help enhance competition in the market for the central
clearing of CDSs and ensure greater protection for investors through
SEC regulatory oversight of the central counterparty-providing timely
centralized clearing and allowing the SEC time to evaluate whether
registrations or permanent exemptions should be granted in the future.56
The SEC has concluded that the operation of CCPs in accordance with
its exemptions will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the CDS
market, increase transparency of exposures to particular reference
entities, increase available information about reference entities, and
allow the SEC to take additional action necessary to protect investors.
57
The conditions that apply to the exemptions are designed to provide that
key investor protections and important elements of Commission
oversight apply, while taking into account that applying all the
particulars of the securities laws could have the unintended consequence
of deterring the prompt establishment and use of a central counterparty.
The SEC has suggested that well-regulated central counterparties should
reduce the potential for disruption in financial markets attributable to
CDSs, and promote operational efficiencies.
The introduction of CCP is at a nascent stage. In December 2008, the
SEC approved temporary exemptions allowing LCH.Cleamet, Ltd., to
operate as a central counterparty for credit default swaps.58 In March
2009, the SEC approved conditional exemptions that allow
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) US Trust LLC to operate as a CCP for
55. Id. "The availability of exemptions under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the
Trust Indenture Act also would mean that CCPs would not incur the costs of preparing disclosure
documents describing eligible CDS and from preparing indentures and arranging for the services of a
trustee." Id.
56. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Approves Exemptions Allowing ICE US
Trust LLC to Operate as Central Counterparty for Credit Default Swaps (Mar. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-49.htm. IntercontinentalExchange. Inc. (ICE) is a Delaware
corporation. Letter from ICE to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Request for Exemption from Certain
Provisions of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933 with Respect to
Cleared Credit Default Swaps (Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/2009/ice-
trust-exreq.pdf.
57. Id. The SEC's authority over the OTC market for CDSs is limited to swap agreements;
Section 2A of the Securities Act and Section 3A of the Exchange Act limit the SEC's authority over
"swap agreements" as defined in Section 206A of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Rules at 7.
58. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Approves Exemptions to Allow Central
Counterparty for Credit Default Swaps (Dec. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-303.htm.,
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clearing credit default swaps. 59 ICE Trust was first to the market in the
United States.
ICE Trust CCP began processing and clearing CDSs in March 2009.
Each member of the ICE clearinghouse contributed $20 million to the
ICE Trust guaranty fund, which will continue in scale with the transfer
of CDS positions to the CCP. 60 ICE contributed an initial $10 million
toward establishing the fund and over a two-year period will increase the
guaranty fund commitment to $100 million.61 ICE describes itself as a
limited purpose bank that serves as a CDS central clearing facility,
subject to regulatory and supervisory requirements of the Federal
Reserve System and the New York State Banking Department. In
addition, it notes that both the SEC and the CFTC may request review of
ICE Trust transaction data from its primary regulator, the Federal
Reserve. 62 ICE Trust serves as a clearing house for all North American
CDS indices, initially focusing on the most active indices. 63 Clearing
members to date are Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, Barclays Capital,
Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase,
Morgan Stanley, HSBC Bank USA, and UBS. 64 Under ICE Trust's
59. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Approves Exemptions Allowing ICE US
Trust LLC to Operate as Central Counterparty for Credit Default Swaps (Mar. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-49.htm; see also Press Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE
Euronext Receives FSA approval in principle of NYSE Liffe Clearing (May 27, 2009), available at
http://www.euronext.com/news/press-release/press-release-1731-EN.html?docid=714650 ("In October
2008, LIFFE and LCH.Cleamet Ltd. entered into binding agreements to establish NYSE Liffe Clearing,
enabling LIFFE to become a self-clearing Recognised Investment Exchange, act as central clearing
counterparty for the London derivatives market and manage its own London clearing operations directly.
Under the NYSE Liffe Clearing arrangements, LIFFE will continue to outsource the existing clearing
guarantee arrangements and related risk functions to LCH.Cleamet, which will remain responsible for
defaulting member positions and applying its rules and resources to resolve defaults, if they occur.").
60. ICE TRUST, supra note 20.
61. DerivSource, ICE Announces Addition of HSBC as Twelfth CDS Clearing Member,
http://derivsource.com/articies/ice-announces-addition-hsbc-twelfth-cds-clearing-member (May 27,
2009). NYSE Euronext announced:
that NYSE Liffe, its international derivatives business, has received approval in principle
from the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to launch NYSE Liffe Clearing, its central
clearing counterparty for its London derivatives market... due to begin operating on 27
July 2009, subject to a period of review by members of the proposed documentation (i.e.
amendments to Rules and Clearing Arrangements) which incorporates the new
arrangements and the finalisation of tax relief with HM Treasury.
Press Release, NYSE Euronext, supra note 59.
62. ICE, Clearing, https://www.theice.com/ice-trust.jhtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
63. Id. ICE Clear Europe in the U.K. is developing the capability of offering central
counterparty clearing services for the European CDS market.
64. ICE TRUST, supra note 20. ICE Trust has:
structured its clearing house to operate with the asset servicing capabilities of The
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation's (DTCC) Deriv/SERV, a service that has
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clearing rules, each bilateral CDS contract between two clearing
members that is submitted to ICE Trust for clearing will be novated. As
part of this process, the submitted contract is replaced by two
superseding CDS contracts between each of the original parties to the
submitted transaction and ICE Trust. Under these new contracts, ICE
Trust will act as "protection buyer" to the original "protection seller"
and as "protection seller" to the original "protection buyer."
The Federal Reserve has described the ICE CCP as follows in its
regulatory approval decision:
ICE Trust is being organized to reduce the risk associated with the trading
and settlement of CDS transactions. . . . CCPs interpose themselves
between counterparties to financial contracts, becoming the buyer to the
seller of the contract and the seller to the contract's buyer. In the absence
of a CCP, each market participant bears the risk, known as counterparty
credit risk, that one or more of its counterparties will default. By
interposing itself between participants and thereby assuming counterparty
credit risk, a CCP enables market participants to accept the best bids and
offers without concern that a counterparty may default.
By assuming counterparty credit risk and enforcing participation
standards and margin requirements, CCPs also can help diminish
systemic risk in market settlement activities. In addition, establishment
of a CCP can lower systemic risk by instituting procedures for the orderly
close out of the positions of any participant who defaults and by
mutualizing the cost of the close-out process.
To limit the risk of default by participants, ICE Trust proposes to
establish strong and objective participant eligibility requirements. For
example, only a firm with a net worth of $5 billion or more and a credit
rating of "A" or better may become a participant. Among other criteria,
each prospective participant also would be required to demonstrate that it
has systems, management, and risk-management expertise with respect to
CDS transactions.... The establishment of ICE Trust as a CCP for CDS
contracts is expected to minimize the impact on financial markets of a
failure by a single participant by collateralizing counterparty risk
exposures through the standardized application of margin and guaranty
fund requirements, by reducing exposures through the netting of CDS
transactions on a multilateral basis, and by standardizing and centrally
managing the close out of a defaulting participant's positions with the
CCP. 
5
proven extremely successful in significantly reducing the post-trade operational backlogs
associated with the CDS market. ICE Trust will utilize DTCC's Deriv/SERV matching
and confirmation service which is already used today by the industry to document cleared
CDS transactions.
65. Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving Application for Membership 2-3, 6 (Mar. 4, 2009),
2009]
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The Federal Reserve generally requires disclosure of CDSs in both
the trading and the banking book of its regulated entities, reporting on
single name and multiname CDSs, such as portfolio or basket CDSs or
CDS indices; and multiname CDSs that are "tranched" credit default
66swaps. Being regulated by the Federal Reserve likely pulls the ICE
under this regulatory framework.
The Federal Reserve has taken oversight jurisdiction for the first
CCP, leaving an uncertain role for the SEC. It can monitor the
conditions under which it granted an exemption, although the public
representations by the SEC and ICE CCP seem to differ as to the amount
of disclosure that will be made to the SEC. Absent transparency, the
SEC will have difficulty exercising any oversight powers. This issue is
particularly important with respect to its investor protection mandate, as
the CCP is likely to have a very significant role in the CDS market.
Since its launch two months ago, ICE Trust CCP has cleared 7,478
transactions, totaling $646 billion of notional value of CDX indexes.67
SEC Chair Mary Schapiro has argued that there should be a
government entity whose responsibilities include monitoring the
financial system for system-wide risk, and is equipped with the tools to
forestall emergencies. 68  Schapiro supports a hybrid approach, with a
single regulator for systemically significant firms, coupled with a
systemic risk council to provide macro-prudential risk oversight.69 This
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders2OO9O3O4al .pdf.
For ICE Trust, as for many CCPs, these resources include margin collateral posted by
participants based on the value and risk associated with their open positions and
participants' contributions to a guaranty fund. The Board expects ICE Trust at all times
to maintain financial resources commensurate with the level and nature of the risks to
which it is exposed.
If a participant defaults, ICE Trust would draw on margin collateral posted by the
participant. If the margin collateral is insufficient, ICE Trust would then look to the
defaulting participant's guaranty fund contribution. Should the defaulting participant's
margin collateral and guaranty fund contribution be insufficient to cover any losses on
the defaulted obligations, ICE Trust would be authorized to use, as needed, other
participants' guaranty fund contributions to satisfy any remaining obligations of the
defaulting party. If the guaranty fund in total is inadequate to cover losses on the
defaulted obligations, ICE Trust would have the ability to assess additional guaranty fund
contributions on nondefaulting participants.
Id. at 5.
66. It requires disclosure also of variations that operate under specifically tailored loss limits,
these may include a "first-loss" tranched credit default swap, a "mezzanine" tranched credit default
swap, and a senior tranched credit default swap. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Instructions
for Semiannual Report of Derivatives Activity 6,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR.243620090630_i.pdf.
67. DerivSource, supra note 61.
68. Schapiro, supra note 37.
69. Id. (as proposed by FDIC Chair Sheila Bair).
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entity should have access, through the functional regulators, to sufficient
information to provide a view of the financial system as a whole; and it
should have sufficient power to direct prudential regulators, strengthen
capital requirements, and direct regulated institutions to reduce leverage
as circumstances require.70
C. Enforcement
In the past year, the SEC has taken steps to streamline its enforcement
procedures, hired new expertise regarding CDSs, and upgraded its
technological capabilities to better detect fraud.7' It has also expanded
its investigations into possible market manipulation by financial
institutions, requiring disclosure of CDS positions. This initiative,
however, has been difficult because of lack of uniform recordkeeping
and reporting, and the SEC's limited oversight role.
The SEC is nonetheless taking action against market misconduct.
The SEC filed the first civil action regarding CDSs in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York in May 2009. The SEC has
alleged that Renato Negrin, a former portfolio manager at hedge fund
investment adviser Millennium Partners, L.P., and Jon-Paul Rorech, a
salesman at Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., engaged in insider trading in
the credit default swaps of VNU N.V., an international holding company
in the media sector.72 The complaint alleges that Rorech learned
information from Deutsche Bank investment bankers about a change to
the proposed VNU bond offering that was expected to increase the price
of the CDSs on VNU bonds. Deutsche Bank was the lead underwriter
for a proposed bond offering by VNU. According to the complaint,
Rorech allegedly illegally tipped Negrin about the contemplated change
to the bond structure, and Negrin then purchased CDSs on VNU for a
Millennium hedge fund. When news of the restructured bond offering
became public in late July 2006, the price of VNU CDSs substantially
increased, and Negrin closed Millennium's VNU CDS position at a
profit of approximately $1.2 million. The SEC's complaint charges
Negrin and Rorech with violations of the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and seeks a judgment ordering them to
pay financial penalties and disgorging ill-gotten gains-plus
prejudgment interest. 73
70. Id.
71. Schapiro, supra note 37.
72. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jon-Paul Rorech, Litigation Release No. 21,023 (May 05, 2009)
("SEC Files First Credit Default Swap Insider Trading Case").
73. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Hedge Fund Manager and Bond
2009] 649
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IV. A GOOD START, BUT...
The SEC has made important changes to address the CDS market,
limited as it has been by its regulatory authority. A critically important
question is whether CDSs will be redefined to come under the regulatory
purview of the SEC, a matter as yet undetermined in the United States.
All of the regulatory oversight options in the United States to date
assume sophisticated market players, and thus limited oversight
requirements. This view ignores the impact of CDSs on other markets
and ordinary citizens. The approach also does not acknowledge that the
CDS market is global but the regulatory framework is local, which
creates cross-border regulatory challenges. ISDA auction based
settlement mechanisms are helpful, but there are problems with access to
accurate counterparty exposure data, and repeat players and industry
insiders are the only participants in the policy debates regarding
regulation. There is disconnection between the issues addressed to date,
and governance issues with respect to CDSs; with a tension between
financial services, corporate law, and bankruptcy regimes.
The SEC needs to determine what type of CDSs are not appropriate
for exemption and the scope of required disclosures. The SEC should
consider whether there is a need for more substantive transparency. For
example, legislative amendments could require protection sellers to
disclose material adverse risk to their financial health at time of sale or
renewal of a CDS. Financial institutions developing new products could
be required to disclose underlying material risks to counterparties.
Credit rating and other entities that recommend investment could be
required to meet a due diligence standard in examining and disclosing
material adverse risk in products being sold in the public market.
Effective remedies should be introduced for purchasers that suffer from
the failure of individuals and entities recommending or rating
derivatives to meet due diligence and disclosure obligations.
Information asymmetries in the OTC CDS market should be reduced
through disclosure requirements that are targeted and measured against
potential outcomes.
Salesman in First Insider Trading Case Involving Credit Default Swaps (May 5, 2009). The SEC
charged Renato Negrin, a former portfolio manager at hedge fund investment adviser Millennium
Partners L.P., and Jon-Paul Rorech, a salesman at Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., with insider trading in
credit default swaps of VNU N.V., an international holding company that owns Nielsen Media and other
media businesses. The case was handled by the SEC Enforcement Division's Hedge Fund Working
Group, which is investigating fraud and market manipulation by hedge fund investment advisers.
Millennium has agreed to escrow the amount that the SEC is seeking as ill-gotten gains pending a final
judgment in this case. The Commission's complaint charges violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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The underlying principle is that there must be sufficient disclosure of
material information to allow market participants to make informed
choices about CDS investments. Protection buyers should be required to
disclose, at the time of purchase, any material adverse risk in the
reference entity that they are aware of, or ought reasonably to be aware
of, so protection sellers can appropriately price the contract. Materiality
in this respect could be based on a standard of whether the facts
regarding adverse risk reasonably would be expected to have a
significant effect on the protection seller's valuation or pricing of the
derivative. Protection sellers should be required to disclose any material
adverse risk to their financial health at the time of the sale and renewal
of a derivative contract, and could have an ongoing disclosure
requirement regarding material adverse change to their ability to settle
the derivative at the point of a credit event occurring. This transparency
would reduce the potential for unnecessary and unfair financial loss for
market participants through greater transparency regarding material risk.
It would require plain and timely disclosure of such information to retail
and other purchasers as an investor protection measure.
Financial institutions and other parties that create new CDS products
should be required to disclose underlying material risks to the
derivatives to counterparties. Counterparties purchasing CDSs should
have enforceable remedies for the failure of these entities and
individuals to disclose material adverse risks at the point of sale of the
derivatives. Such remedies would increase the transparency of risks
associated with new products as they develop, allowing for market
innovation while trying to ensure that there is sufficient information in
the market to assess and price risk. They would also ensure that those
making the products available are providing a type of indemnification
with respect to the product, in terms of assurances that the material
adverse risks are known by the counterparties at the time of sale.74
Restricting the supply of derivatives products will relocate the
products to other jurisdictions, given their high degree of mobility.
Increased transparency is one necessary measure; however, enhancing
disclosure alone does not ensure that purchasers can properly interpret
the information, nor does it assist in offering remedies for misconduct.
One way to compensate for potential negative externalities is to set a
price for participation in the market. For example, one could tax credit
derivatives on a per transaction basis.7  A small amount on each
transaction could be placed in a central trust fund in the domestic
74. For a discussion of these recommendations, see Sarra, supra note 9.
75. Id. at 9.
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jurisdiction in which the credit derivative is being purchased. That fund
would be available to counterparties that had been unfairly harmed by
failure to disclose or other misconduct by market participants; or the
fund could be restricted to payments during financial crises. Not unlike
deposit insurance funds, pension guarantee funds, or securities law "fair
funds," the fund would be available, up to some specified cap, to
cushion such losses. The fund could possibly be empowered to impose
risk-based levies on the counterparties that cause the losses, in an
attempt to partially recover when the counterparty is solvent. 76 On
insolvency, such a claim by the fund would be eligible for debt to equity
conversion along with other creditors' claims. Such a strategy would
spread the cost of misconduct across parties most actively buying and
selling CDSs and other derivatives, would allow cost recovery against
specific counterparties in some cases, and would diminish the risk of
unfair losses to end purchasers. Such a transaction-based fee, however,
would have to be priced such that it was not merely the price of
misconduct.
The SEC should also consider how mark-to-market accounting has
influenced and been influenced by the credit derivatives market, and
whether it should be adjusted to account for current financial
uncertainty. 77  Mark-to-market accounting requires that asset price
shocks be reflected on balance sheets, creating their own shocks and
raising the question of whether market prices appropriately reflect
economic value or whether this approach fosters greater uncertainty for
investors.78
Credit rating and other entities that recommend investment in
derivatives should meet a due diligence standard in examining and
disclosing material adverse risk in the derivative products being sold in
the public market. Credit rating agencies should be required to disclose
76. Id. at 10.
77. Under current mark-to-market, some long-term investors face pressure to sell their CDSs
because of short term funding requirements. The opacity of structured financial products has made them
harder to value, thus negatively affecting secondary market liquidity. See Janis Sarra, Restructuring of
the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market in Canada, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW,
2008 (Janis Sarra ed. 2009). Essentially, by reflecting market moves, fair value accounting increases the
volatility of reported earnings. Arguably, officers' incentives to realize mark-to-market losses are also
influenced by the extent to which their investors will reward or negatively sanction them for how they
value downside risk.
78. The Financial Stability Forum is examining accounting and valuation procedures for
financial derivative instruments that are difficult to price in times of market stress. Current accounting
rules do not allow valuation to be expressed as a range of potential outcomes, yet allowing such
disclosure could offer greater information to market participants. See Press Release, Financial Stability
Forum, Financial Stability Forum Issues Recommendations and Principles to Strengthen Financial
Systems (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_-090402a.pdf?noframes=l.
652
HeinOnline -- 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 652 2009-2010
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
all fees associated with a rating, as well as consulting fees received from
the bank or entity selling the derivatives. There should be effective
remedies for purchasers and other market participants from failure of
those individuals and entities recommending or rating derivatives to
meet due diligence and disclosure obligations. Such a move would
create appropriate incentives for credit rating agencies and others that
recommend investment in credit derivatives to undertake diligent
examination and assessment of products, including ascertaining and
disclosing material risk, and to reduce their conflicts of interest.
The SEC should consider several public policy questions in its efforts
to create CCPs. For example, is the appropriate approach to CCPs to
exempt securities, or draw them under the banking regulatory umbrella?
How will its regulatory intervention recognize the interconnected nature
of financial services markets and real economic activity? The SEC has a
potential role in crafting new oversight that could slow inappropriate
speculative aspects of the market and assist risk management. The CCP
system enables regulators to better monitor transactions that are effected
through the use of a central counterparty and arguably mitigate the
systemic risks created by OTC derivatives. 79 The question is whether
there will be sufficient transparency to ensure systemic risks are
adequately monitored. The SEC has stated that it believes that eligible
CDS participants are sophisticated investors who do not require the
protections of registration under state securities laws; yet one remaining
question is how the activities of these investors may harm the markets
over which the SEC does have regulatory oversight.
The introduction of CCPs does not address the incentives that were
driving the market at the time of the failure; arguably, they continue to
support the speculative aspects of the market by facilitating the
transactions. While CCPs do address some aspects of systemic risk,
their entry into the market may have short circuited a broader normative
public policy discussion about the need for a speculative market on top
of the risk management benefits of the market, as well as discussion
about the ability of financial products markets to seriously undermine
real economic activity.
There is a need for development of a broad global consensus
regarding products that should be eligible for CCPs, as well as the
degree of oversight and remedies for failure to observe standards. One
objective should be reducing counterparty risk, particularly given the
ripple effects in the real economy from counterparty failure. In the
United Kingdom, financial authorities have called for more robust
79. Schapiro, supra note 37.
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counterparty risk management, recommending that all OTC derivative
trades, whether centrally cleared, should be subject to robust
arrangements to mitigate counterparty risk. Increased standardization of
products would help ensure that parties understand derivatives products
they are purchasing and would assist greatly in the development of
clearing and auction activities, likely reducing operational risk.
Standardization should extend to products that are bought and sold at
significant volumes, whether or not they can be cleared through a CCP.
Standardization, however, requires a shared global understanding of
terms of contracts, so that regulators can appropriately monitor and
enforce, and so that parties have certainty in their remedies wherever the
derivative settles. The SEC could play a leadership role in building
global consensus.
The SEC may also have a role in encouraging best practices standards
for CDS transactions, through collaboration between regulators and
market participants, including with respect to counterparty credit risk
management, oversight, liquidity management, and netting. It may
reduce counterparty risk, increase transparency in the market, and move
towards creation of shared definitions of derivatives terms and shared
standards and overarching principles. A hybrid of state and market
driven strategies may be most effective. The market is able to more
quickly adapt standards and measurement of risk to new product
developments, but industry-standard setting alone is insufficient, and in
the future may create self-serving standards. Current initiatives by
industry participants could be enhanced by participation of regulatory
authorities and investor protection organizations or other NGOs, to
ensure public interest concerns are included in new standards.
Regulators should consider requiring public disclosure of "no
economic interest at risk" derivatives and prohibiting actions by these
derivatives holders that lead to default events, to address the moral
hazard of financial products imperilling the real economy. This
recommendation would reduce incentives for those holding derivatives
products to engage in actions that precipitate credit events where they
have no economic interest at risk.80 Many insurance statutes require the
insured have at least a factual expectation of loss if the object of the
insurance suffers pecuniary damage, loss, or destruction-and the
factual expectation requires a lawful or substantial economic interest in
the preservation of the insured property. The same approach should be
considered for CDSs in terms of requiring that a creditor that has hedged
its claims through a CDS discloses the real quantum and nature of its
80. Sarra, supra note 9, at 12.
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remaining economic interest, if any, before it has decision or control
rights in proceedings involving the reference entity.
It is also necessary to engage globally and align strategies with other
jurisdictions to the extent possible. The Volcker 2009 report urged
establishing "coordinated efforts to greatly reduce the growth and size of
outstanding contracts through bilateral compression agreements" and
provide a consistent international regulatory framework to share
information and enter appropriate cooperative arrangements with
authorities of other countries responsible for overseeing activities. 81
The European Commission's High Level Expert Group on Financial
Supervision, chaired by Jacques de Larosiere, concluded in February
2009 that there is a need to take a wide look at the functioning of
derivative markets, finding that the simplification and standardization of
most OTC derivatives and the development of appropriate risk-
mitigation techniques, plus transparency measures, could go a long way
toward restoring trust in the functioning of CDS markets.82 The de
Larosire Committee determined that in the short term, an important
goal should be to reduce the counterparty risks that exist in the system
by creating in the EU of at least one well-capitalized central clearing
house for OTC CDSs that would be simplified and standardized. This
clearing house should be supervised by the Committee of European
Securities Regulators, the relevant monetary authorities, and the
European Central Bank. The Committee also reported that to restore
confidence in securitized markets, it is important to require, at the
international level, issuers of complex securities to retain a meaningful
amount of the underlying risk on their books for the life of the
instrument.83 The European Commission announced after the report
that it will have specific legislative measures in place within the next
two years. Major banks and brokers involved in the CDS industry in
Europe have committed to using an EU-based central counterparty
clearing for their trades by the end of 2010 agreeing to regulators'
requests to reduce risk.8 4 With a central clearing house, the counterparty
81. GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 52-53
(2009).
82. In October 2008 the Commission mandated a High Level Group chaired by Jacques de
Larosiire to give advice on the future of European financial regulation and supervision. The Group
presented its report on February 25, 2009, and its recommendations were endorsed by the Commission
in its Communication to the Spring European Council of March 2009. 3L3 Joint Contribution to the
European Commission's Consultation on the Improvement of Supervision for the Financial Services
Sector, http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/fcdfl 1d5-00e4-41 1c-8093-1caa6a5e0faa/10-April-2009-3L3-Joint-
Response.aspx (Apr. 10, 2009).
83. Id. at 95.
84. The letter's signatories include Barclays Capital, Citigroup Global Markets, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and UBS, all members of the
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would monitor the reliability of the parties and cover possible defaults
through fees paid in advance by the traders. 85  The EU may opt for
mandatory use of CCPs as opposed to the voluntary model adopted in
the United States to date. The SEC could acquire a better understanding
of the public policy discussion in the EU and serve as a conduit to bring
those considerations to the US public policy debate.
V. CONCLUSION
The public policy discussion on regulatory oversight of CDSs has just
begun, yet the market for CCPs and other initiatives may overtake the
debate. There is need to build greater international consensus on how to
encourage the positive risk management aspects of derivatives, while
slowing the speculative aspects of the market that create both
transactional and systemic risk. The CDS market has few jurisdictional
boundaries and regulators need to account for their ubiquitous, elusive,
and opaque nature. The public interest aspects of CDSs require more
consideration, as CDSs were a major contributing factor to the market
failure, but there are, to date, few regulatory initiatives to address both
the agency problems and externalities caused by their use. It is also time
for more integrated thinking regarding the links between securities law,
financial products, and corporate governance.
ISDA, supported by the European Banking Federation (EBF), which represents both buyers and sellers
in the derivatives market. Id.
85. Id. There is debate among EU member states about the scope and the location of the CCP.
France is pushing for Paris, which would exclude the U.K. market, which is the most developed in
Europe.
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